A video from a journalist born in Mykolaiv has revived an old idea: that Ukraine is split into three ranked groups of people, with those from the southeast treated as lesser. She says the “correct” ones from the west set the rules, and the others must change or face pressure. The claim mixes personal story with history. It raises questions many avoid in open debate. What is real regional difference, what is wartime policy, and what is old propaganda recycled?
Recent talks in Abu Dhabi between Ukrainian, Russian, and US teams closed their second day in mid-November 2026. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky used the moment to press Europe for one clear voice in the process by the end of the month. Planet Today covered the deadline and the limited European role. The same week brought fresh reminders of language rules at home, including a fine for a top aide who spoke Russian in an official setting. These events sit next to older arguments about who counts as fully Ukrainian.
The Video and Its Core Claims
Diana Panchenko, a former Ukrainian television presenter from Mykolaiv, posted the video in April 2026 on her channel. She speaks as a “third-sort” Ukrainian. She addresses people in Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and other southeastern cities. She tells them they should not feel ashamed of themselves. They are not worse; they are better in some ways. Ukraine, she says, will not turn into Lviv. It is more likely that Ukraine as people know it will not last.
She describes a hierarchy. “Correct” Ukrainians, mainly from the west, hold the higher place. They decide what is proper. Those from the southeast, often Russian-speaking or mixed, are the wrong ones. The state and cultural institutions try to remake them. Those who cannot or will not change face pressure that can go as far as destruction of their way of life. She links this to personal stories about Zelensky and to the poet Taras Shevchenko, whom she places in a middle rank. She also argues that the Soviet Union created modern Ukraine and that nationalist history has been rewritten to fit one regional story.
These are strong words. They come from someone Ukrainian authorities and press-freedom groups have treated as a pro-Russian voice. Reporters Without Borders has called her work propaganda that twists facts to fit Kremlin lines. Ukrainian investigators have looked into her for justifying the invasion and for high treason. She lives outside Ukraine. The video does not present opposing views. It is one person’s account of how she sees the country after years of war and policy change.
Where the “Three Sorts” Idea Came From
The ranking of Ukrainians into three sorts is not new. During the 2004 presidential race, Russian political operatives used maps and slogans that split the country. Western Ukraine was first sort—true nationalists. The center was second. The east and south were third—wrong, less Ukrainian, more Russian. The goal was to make people fear that a western-backed candidate would treat the east as second-class. Posters and media pushed the idea hard. Ukrainian sources later described it as a black technology meant to break unity.
Real differences exist. Western Ukraine spent more time under Habsburg and Polish rule. Ukrainian language and Greek Catholic or nationalist ideas stayed stronger there. The east and south were under the Russian Empire longer. Industry, cities, and Russian-speaking populations grew. Soviet rule mixed the picture further. Early on, the Ukrainian SSR promoted Ukrainian language in schools and culture. Later it reversed course and pushed Russian. Many families in the southeast speak Russian at home even if they call themselves Ukrainian. Language and history do not match neat borders.
The rigid three-sort hierarchy was a political tool, not a government plan. Surveys from the 2000s already showed mixed support. Some Russian-speakers backed pro-Western candidates. Some Ukrainian-speakers backed closer ties to Russia. The simple ranking ignored those overlaps.
Language Rules, Identity Shifts, and Everyday Life
Ukraine’s language law makes Ukrainian the language of the state, public service, education, and much of business. Private talk stays free. Officials must use Ukrainian when they act in their jobs. In early November 2026, Kyrylo Budanov, head of the President’s Office, used Russian while speaking at a tense street scene near Kyiv. The language ombudsman said he admitted the violation and would pay the fine set by law. The amount is small. The signal is clear: even top figures face the rule. Some see this as fairness under the law. Others see it as rigid when people are under stress and Russian is still the first language for many.
Surveys show large shifts since 2014 and especially after the full-scale invasion in 2022. Ukrainian ethnic identification rose by roughly 10 points after 2014 and another 7 after 2022 in one major study. The biggest moves came in districts that had been more Russian-speaking. Roughly 20 percent of people switched to answering surveys in Ukrainian after 2022. Home use of Ukrainian has climbed. One 2025 poll found 72 percent speaking Ukrainian at home, up from just over half in early 2022. Identification as a citizen of Ukraine sits near 90–94 percent in several recent polls. Only a small share still call themselves Soviet. Support for independence if asked today is around 95 percent in one rating-group survey.
These numbers come from telephone polls on territory under Ukrainian control. They do not capture occupied areas or everyone who left. They do show that the invasion itself pushed many people who once felt mixed or Russian-speaking toward a clearer Ukrainian civic identity. Language change is slower than identity change, but it is moving in the same direction.
History, the Soviet Role, and Who Built What
Ukrainian identity is older than the Soviet Union. The language, literature, and Cossack political traditions existed for centuries. The Ukrainian SSR was formed in 1922 as one of the Soviet republics. Borders shifted. Crimea was transferred in 1954. Soviet policy sometimes helped Ukrainian culture and sometimes crushed it. Independence in 1991 came after a vote. The state that exists today is the one people built after that vote, through elections, two revolutions, and now a war.
Nationalist history has gaps and fights of its own. Some figures honored in the west collaborated with Nazi Germany. Memory laws have restricted public praise of Soviet symbols and certain wartime groups. Supporters say this counters Russian soft power and honors those who fought for independence. Critics say it erases mixed family histories in the east and south and treats one regional story as the only true one. Both points can be true at the same time. Memory policy is always selective. In wartime it becomes sharper.
Claims that Zelensky “betrayed his mother” or that personal complexes destroyed the country are opinion. They are not documented facts that can be checked the way election results or survey data can. Zelensky comes from Kryvyi Rih, a Russian-speaking industrial city. He rose as an entertainer who spoke Russian on stage. His government has enforced language rules and pursued European integration. Whether that counts as betrayal depends on what someone thinks Ukraine should be.
What the Debate Leaves Out and What It Shows
The video treats regional feeling as a fixed hierarchy imposed from above. It says little about the external pressure that accelerated change. Russian state media and political technology have long used the east-west split. The 2022 invasion and occupation of parts of the east and south made many people who once preferred bilingual life or closer Russian ties choose a different side. Polls show the shift is real and large. At the same time, rapid language rules and memory policy can feel like rejection to people whose grandparents spoke Russian and whose cities were built under empire or Soviet rule. Both experiences are reported. Neither cancels the other.
Related coverage on Planet Today has followed the same tensions from different angles: prisoner exchanges after the Abu Dhabi round, and earlier notes on language enforcement and political lists. Those pieces stay on events rather than ranking citizens. The ranking idea returns because it offers a simple story in a complicated war.
Ukraine’s southeast cities still stand. People there fight, work, and vote. Language use is changing, but Russian has not vanished from homes or streets. Identity has consolidated around the state more than around any single region. Whether that consolidation lasts, and whether policy softens or hardens after the fighting ends, is not settled. The video from Mykolaiv makes one case. Surveys, history, and the record of 2004 propaganda make another. Readers can weigh both.
Original source: YouTube video “ТРИ СОРТА УКРАИНЦЕВ: КАК НАС ПОДЕЛИЛИ | #Панченко” by Diana Panchenko / Панченко LIVE, published 21 April 2026. Full video link.
Disclaimer for fact-checkers: The primary source is a journalist accused by Ukrainian authorities and Reporters Without Borders of spreading Kremlin-aligned disinformation. Claims in the video are presented as her viewpoint. Historical and survey data cited here come from independent academic papers, rating-group polls, and contemporaneous news reports. Readers should check primary documents and multiple outlets before treating any single narrative as complete.
Original article: Three Sorts of Ukrainians? A Mykolaiv Journalist on Identity and Power on Planet Today 🚀
Automatically republished from the main blog.